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VII.
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VIII. CONCLUSION

The topic "agency" includes the areas of "master and servant" as
well as those of "principal and agent." There were few cases in
these areas decided by the Tennessee courts during the period under
survey. Generally, basic principles were applied to routine cases.
In certain instances the reliance upon a prior fact determination
avoided the necessity of an elaborate treatment of the facts. In one

or two cases the court reached a result that may not be deemed
desirable though supported by much authority. Significant points
received less attention than they deserved in certain cases. In one
case the basic question turned on contract, rather than agency, law.
Attorneys at law, a special category of agent, was dealt with in one
case.

I. CREATION OF RELATION

Dobson & Johnson, Inc. v. Waldron' dealt briefly with the problem
of creation of an agency. Real estate brokers had shown land owned
by the defendant to prospective purchasers, the plaintiffs. The
landowner had knowledge of this and consented. The brokers handled
the original written offer by the plaintiffs and delivered it to the
defendant, who made a counter-offer upon the back of the offer.
The brokers submitted this counter-offer to the plaintiffs. The court
held that the brokers were agents of the defendant. The holding appears to be sound.
The principal point in the case was the attempt by the defendant
*Professor of Law, University of Tennessee College of Law.

1. 336 S.W.2d 313 (Tenn. App. M.S. 1960).
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to revoke his counter-offer. The issue was handled as a contract
question and turned upon when an offer, which by its terms expires
on a day named, can be accepted and the necessity of revocation of
an offer being communicated to the offeree prior to acceptance by him.
If the attempted revocation of the offer be deemed to involve the
2
revocation of agency, the result seems equally sound.
II.

LIABILITY OF PRINCIPAL TO

THIRD PERSONS-CONTRACTS

The case of Dobson & Johnson,Inc. v. Waldron just discussed 3 held
that the principal was liable to the third person upon the contract
made by his agent. The contract was obviously within the scope
of the authority, unless the revocation was effective. The court applied normal contract rules and found that the offer had been accepted prior to the attempted revocation. 4 In so doing, the court
found that the chancellor had erred in resolving the issues in favor of
the defendant.
III. LiABILITY OF PRINCIPAL TO THIRD PERSONS-TORTS
It is interesting to note that, in all of the cases involving the
liability of the principal for the acts of his servants or agents arising
in tort, the principal or master was not held liable.
Ball v. Whitaker5 involved the well-known problem of the liability
of a master for negligence of his servant toward a rider in the vehicle
driven by the servant, when the rider is riding with the consent
or invitation of the servant in violation of the explicit directions of
the master.
An employee of a carnival company was riding on a wagon pulled
by a heavy truck driven by the servant of the operator of a trucking
company. The trucking company had a colntract with the carnival
company to haul the wagons from the show grounds to the railroad
2. Apparent authority is not terminated merely because actual authority
is terminated. Ordinarily apparent authority is not terminated until the
third person has notice of the termination of the authority. RESTATEMENT
(SECOND), AGENCY § 124A, 125 (1958). Of course, apparent authority would

terminate when the time which conditioned the apparent authority expired.
Id. § 126.
3. See note 1 supraand accompanying text.
4. The offer by its terms was to expire on July 1. The defendant attempted to revoke his offer on the evening of July 1. On June 30 the plaintiffs wrote an acceptance upon the contract, and upon July 1 notified the
brokers by telephone. They mailed a letter to the defendants giving notice
of the acceptance in a letter postmarked in the evening of July 1. There
was a contradiction in the evidence as to whether the agent told the principal
that the offer had already been accepted when the principal called the
agent to revoke the offer. 336 S.W.2d at 314-15.
5. 342 S.W.2d 67 (Tenn. App. E.S. 1960).
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yards. The plaintiff boarded the wagon with the implied permission
of the driver, though the driver had explicit directions from the
defendant to allow no one to ride upon the wagon or truck. The
court held that the plaintiff was a trespasser as far as the defendant
master was concerned, that the defendant would be liable only for
wanton and wilful acts of the driver-servant, and that there was no
evidence of wilful and wanton conduct, though there was clearly
negligence. In so doing, the court followed the well-established Tennessee law,6 which may be the majority view in the United States.7
The theoretical objections to the rule are numerous: in many areas
negligence toward a trespasser after his presence is known is called
wilful and wanton; 8 the rider might be in better position under the
trespasser rule if he had not secured the permission of the servant;
The wilfulness and wantonness of the agent usually tends to insulate
the master rather than make him liable; 9 and finally, the servant is
obviously within the scope of his employment in driving the vehicle. 10
The plaintiff attempted to avoid the rule barring his recovery by
showing that the defendant's contract provided that defendant would
be "responsible for the safety of the property and for any loss or
injury which may be sustained by anyone because of the manner in
which the property is hauled." The court simply said that this was an
indemnity contract and did not make the hauler an insurer or modify
6. Modern cases reaffirming the position in Tennessee include: Reynolds

v. Knowles, 185 Tenn. 337, 206 S.W.2d 375 (1947); and Home Stores, Inc. v.
Parker, 179 Tenn. 372, 166 S.W.2d 619 (1942).
7. RESTATEAMENT (SEcOND), AGENCY, Reporter's Notes § 242 (App. 1958)
observes that there is a distinct split of authority and that, though it is often
hard to tell what the basis of a particular decision is, "in most of the cases
below, the master was found not liable .... "
8. A leading authority has said in speaking of the duty of a landowner:
"In a number of states it is still said that there is no liability even
to a discovered trespasser unless the defendant's conduct is wilful or
wanton. Some of these jurisdictions have defined 'wilful and wanton'
...to include a failure to use ordinary care after discovery of the

trespasser's presence....
The great majority of courts have now discarded 'wilful and wanton'
as a limitation, and have held that when the presence of the trespasser
is discovered there is a duty to use ordinary care to avoid injuring him
by active operations." SMWTH & PROSSER, CASES ON TORTS 795 (2d ed.
1957).
9. It was originally held that wilful and wanton conduct of the servant
insulated the master because wilfulness and wantonness took the servant
out of the scope of the employment. See Wright v. Wilcox, 19 Wend. 343
(N.Y. 1838). Modern cases have abandoned this as a rule of law, but the
feeling persists that wilfulness and wantonness is relevant as showing that
the servant was not furthering the master's business or interest. See, e.g.,
Earley v. Roadway Express, 106 F. Supp. 958-60 (E.D. Tenn. 1952). The
liability for such conduct is often viewed as an exception to a general rule
of non-liability. Fugate v. Cincinnati, N.O., & Tex. Pac. Ry., 181 Tenn. 608, 183
S.W.2d 867 (1949). An earlier case, Reynolds v. Knowles, 185 Tenn. 337,
206 S.W.2d 375 (1947), is noted at 20 TENN. L. REv. 290 (1948).
10. This is directly stated in the RESTATEMENT (SECOND), AGENCY § 242
(1958).
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his liability to third persons in any way; the contract being for the
benefit of the carnival company, the plaintiff had no rights thereunder."'
The plaintiff's further attempt to recover was based upon the
Tennessee Code Annotated provision requiring motor freight agents
to carry liability insurance. Such insurance must undertake to pay
for injuries to persons by reason of negligent operation of the motor
carrier while engaged in carrying property. 12 The court simply
pointed out that the act itself had an exception making the act inapplicable to motor vehicles "while used exclusively for carrying ...
property between railroad depots and any points in any city, town or
suburb thereof ... "13
McCann Steel Co. v. Third National Bank14 involved the liability
of a bank to one whom the bank knew had a beneficial interest in a
deposit when the bank paid funds out of the account upon forged
endorsements on checks. The case could have been noted under section I of this discussion since it involved the question of whether
agency existed.
The facts are interesting and somewhat involved. The McCann
Steel Company contracted with Hall, doing business as the Middle
Tennessee Erection Company, for the erection of certain steel. Hall
acted as an independent contractor. 5 By agreement between the
parties the Steel Company opened an account in the name of the
independent contractor to enable the contractor to pay costs. The
agreement provided that checks would be signed by the independent
contractor and by a representative of the Steel company. The independent contractor filed false time reports so that checks were drawn
for work not actually done. Instead of delivering the checks to the
payees, Hall, the independent contractor, forged endorsements of
the payees to the checks. The bank cashed the checks, and the
11. 342 S.W.2d at 70. The possible interpretation that the agreement related to damage to persons resulting from damage to the property apparently
did not occur to the court; nor did the court seem to consider the possibility
that such a contract was a third party beneficiary contract.
12. TENr. CODE ANN. § 65-1517 (1956).
13. TEN. CODE AN. §.65-1503 (1956).
14. 337 S.W.2d 886 (Tenn. App. M.S. 1960).
15. The court accepted the chancellor's finding as not being contrary to the
preponderance of the record. The chancellor said:
"Robert A. Hall, in the performance of said contracts with complainant, was an independent contractor. He selected his employees,
exercised supervision over them, paid the privilege taxes imposed
upon contractors, carried workmen's compensation and public liability
insurance as such contractor, and had actual charge and supervision of
the erection of the steel on said job. Complainant looked to said
Hall for results only, and from time to time did inspect the job so as
to see that it was being done in accordance with contractual obligation.
Hall was not an agent of the complainant." 337 S.W.2d at 888-89.
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present suit was brought by the Steel Company to recover amounts
so paid by the defendant bank.
The court found that the bank knew of the interest which the
plaintiff had in the deposit and that the plaintiff was guilty of no
negligence or fault either in drawing the checks originally or in
failing to discover the forgeries earlier. The case was settled as a
suit between one having an interest in a deposit and the bank. The
court held that previous comparable cases were distinguishable since
in those cases the forgeries were committed by an agent of the de6
positor.'
The case is listed here because the conduct of the independent contractor was tortious. The case is consistent with the normal rule that
the principal is not liable for the tortious acts of an independent
contractor. It could have been listed in section II of this discussion
since in a previous case the liability of the employer was based upon
a warranty under the Negotiable Instrument Law; there it was held
that the principal was bound by the agent's warranty.' 7
The court's repeated statements that the independent contractor
was not an agent cannot be strongly questioned; the possible implication, however, which results from quoting the chancellor's finding that because Hall was an independent contractor he was not an
agent, is unfortunate. 8 It is perfectly clear that many independent
contractors are agents with power to bind the principal in contract
matters. 9 However, the Restatement recognizes that the term "independent contractor" frequently is understood to mean a person
who is not an agent at all 20 It is assumed that the court found Hall
an independent contractor not because he was not an agent, but rather
because he was a type of independent contractor who could not be an
agent. The court said that "each party was acting for himself" and
16. Litchfield Shuttle Co. v. Cumberland Valley Nat'l Bank, 134 Tenn. 379,
183 S.W. 1006 (1916), involved forgeries by a branch manager of the
plaintiff corporation. The manager had authority to draw checks on the
plaintiff's account.
United States Guar. Co. v. Hamilton Nat'l Bank, 189 Tenn. 143, 223 S.W.2d
519 (1949) involved forgeries by a payroll clerk of the depositor. The basis
of the decision was the negligence of the depositor. In the principal case
the court emphasized that the employee of the depositor, acting in the scope
of her apparent authority, made out the fraudulent checks.
17. Litchfield Shuttle Co. v. Cumberland Valley Nat'l Bank, sunra note 16.
18. The language of the chancellor is quoted in full in note 15 supra. The
court gave further support to the implication when it was joined by a statement that Hall was not an agent but an independent contractor acting for
himself. 337 S.W.2d at 892.
19. RESTATEMENT (SEcOND), AGENCY § 2 (1958), in speaking of independent
contractors, says: "He may or may not be an agent." Section 220 further
makes it clear that though "servant" and "independent contractor" are
mutually exclusive, there is no such exclusiveness between "agent" and
"independent contractor."
20. RESTATEMENT (SECOND), AGENCY § 438, comment i (1958).
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that they "were each acting separately, and there was no such agency
relationship between them .... -21
A third case involving liability of the master for the torts of the
servant involved the question of the effect of a convenant not to sue
given by the plaintiff to the servant. In Stewart v. Craig2 the plaintiff, in suing the master, was met with the defense that the plaintiff
had given the servant a covenant not to sue. The court held that this
was a defense whenever liability was based solely upon the doctrines
of respondeat superior. The court reiterated its previous position that
if the plaintiff cannot recover against the servant, the master cannot
be liable. 23 It is submitted that this is not universally true. It is
possible to imagine a case in which the knowledge or conduct of two
servants combined would make the master liable even where neither
servant would be liable to the third person.
Tennessee, however, has been steadily moving toward a rule that if
there be any defense available to the servant, the same defense is
available to the master. 24 In this case the court disapproved an earlier
case 25 "in so far.., as [it] disagrees with what we have said herein. '26
The basis of the opinion was explained in part upon the doctrine
that one cannot do indirectly what one cannot do directly, and in
part upon a circuity of action that would result when the third
person recovered from the master and the master obtained reimbursement against the servant-covenantee, who could then sue the
original claimant-covenantor. Needless to say, this argument involves
the interpretation that the covenant not to sue is breached when
another person, the master, sues his servant. This would, it is sug21. 337 S.W.2d at 893.
22. 344 S.W.2d 761 (Tenn. 1961).
23. The language was: "[U]nder our authorities where the injured party
is barred from suing the servant, he cannot sue the master, where the suit is
predicated solely upon negligence of the servant under the doctrine of
respondeat superior." 344 S.W.2d at 763. The court also said that the servant,
the immediate actor, "could not be charged with liability for the tort; the
principal, the remote actor, had no part in the tortious transaction and
could not be held responsible." 344 S.W.2d at 762, relying upon Loveman
Co. v. Bayless, 128 Tenn. 307, 160 S.W. 841 (1913).
24. The court cited two particular cases. In Raines v. Mercer, 165 Tenn.
415, 55 S.W.2d 263 (1932), the plaintiff had before the suit married the
servant. She was held unable to recover against the master since she
could not have sued her husband, the servant. In Graham v. Miller, 182
Tenn. 434, 187 S.W.2d 622 (1945), a minor child injured by his father,
the servant, was held unable to recover against the master since the
child could not have sued the father.
25. Mink v. Majors, 39 Tenn. App. 50, 279 S.W.2d 714 (W.S. 1953).
26. In so disapproving of the former decision, the court stated that legislation considered necessary by Dean Wade would not now be necessary
since the result of the court's opinion is to adopt the "sound, reasonable and
logical conclusion." 344 S.W.2d at 765. Dean Wade's suggestion was contained
in his Torts-1956 Tennessee Survey, 9 VAwD. L. REv. 1137, 1154 (1956). It
is submitted that Dean Wade was speaking primarily of the joint tortfeasor
case, and not the case of master and servant.
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gested, convert a covenant not to sue to an agreement to hold harmless.
In any event, it seems perfectly clear in Tennessee that the third
person who has given the servant a covenant not to sue cannot succeed in an action against the master for torts committed by the
servant.
IV. LTABILITY

TO

THmn PERSONS-NOTICE THROUGH AGENT

One case, Dobson & Johnson, Inc. v. Waldron,27 previously mentioned, held that notice to the agent was notice to the principal. The
court quoted from previous Tennessee cases 28 and from secondary
authority 29 to show that the principal is charged with notice to the
agent received while the agent is acting in the scope of his authority
and which is in reference to a matter over which his authority extends. The rule seems sound, though there is a distinction between
notice by notification and notice which results from the acquisition of
knowledge. 30 It seems that the time, place, and manner of the agent's
acquiring knowledge is immaterial except in the case of knowledge
confidentially acquired. 31 For the notice to be effective, it must of
course be within the actual or apparent authority of the agent to
32
receive such notice or notification.
V. DuTiEs

AND LIABILITIES OF AGENT TO PRINCIPAL-FOR BREACH OF
CONTRACT

3

Holcomb v. Steele involved the question of a breach of an attorney's duties to his client and his liability for breach of contract and
tortious conduct.
Attorneys sought to reach 34 a portion of a recovery by a plaintiff
against a defendant in a negligence case. The court viewed the facts
as showing that a guest in an automobile was injured in a collision
between the host's car and another vehicle. The attorneys represented
the host in an action against the other driver. Then they represented
27. 336 S.W.2d 313 (Tenn. App. M.S. 1960).

28. Woodfolk v. Blount, 4 Tenn. 138 (1816); Williams v. Title Guar. & Trust
Co., 81 Tenn. App. 128, 212 S.W.2d 897 (E.S. 1948).
29. 2 Am. JuR. Agency § 368 (1936).
30.

RESTATEMENT (SECOND), AGENCY §

9 (1958).

31. Id. § 276. The reporter's Notes to the section show that this is the
majority view. Of course, if the agent did not remember, he did not have
knowledge. Interstate Life & Acc. Co. v. Potter, 17 Tenn. App. 381, 68 S.W.2d
119 (M.S. 1933).
32. RESTATEMENT (SEcoND), AGENCY § 268 & comments (1958).
33. 342 S.W.2d 236 (Tenn. App. E.S. 1958).
34. The attorney "filed an intervening petition." There was a jury verdict.
342 S.W.2d 237.
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the guest and advised her to accept a $400 settlement from the other
driver. The guest was then advised by another attorney that she had
a cause of action against the host as well. Ultimately the guest
recovered judgment of $3000 against the host and $3000 against the
other driver.
In the meantime the guest had attempted to discharge her attorneys, who successfully resisted an attempt to secure a court order
discharging them. Special jury verdicts in the immediate proceedings
had determined that the interests of the guest and host were conflicting, that the attorneys had advised the guest of her rights against the
host, and that the attorneys were guilty of negligence in handling the
guest's claim. It appears further that, after the other attorney entered the case, the attorneys did file a suit against the other driver
but none against the host.
The court held that the attorneys could not recover on their
contract of employment since they had been negligent and had
breached their duty to properly advise and represent their client
and had breached their contingent fee contract.
The court said that though attorneys do not guarantee the accuracy
of all that they do, they are bound to exercise reasonable skill and
diligence in attending to business entrusted to them and to possess
such reasonable knowledge of well-settled rules of law as will
enable them to perform the duties they undertake.
The court rejected the contention of the attorneys that they were
not negligent because they had advised the client of her rights against
the host. In view of the special duty which attorneys have to their
clients because of the uniqueness of their agency,35 and in view of

the general agency rule prohibiting an agent from representing ad35. AMERICAN BAR Ass'N, CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETcs No. 6 (1933)
deals specifically with the duties of an attorney in representing adverse
interests. The canon states in part:
"It is unprofessional to represent conflicting interests when,
in behalf of one client, it is his duty to contend for that which duty to
another client requires him to oppose.
The obligation to represent the client with undivided loyalty and
not to divulge his secrets or confidences forbids also the subsequent
acceptance of retainers or employment from others in matters adversely
affecting any interest of the client with respect to which confidence
has been reposed."

It should be remembered that being guilty of unprofessional conduct is a
ground for disbarment in Tennessee by statute. TENN. CODE ANN. § 29-308
(1956).
It should also be remembered that rule 31 of the Tennessee Court of Appeals adopts the Canons of Professional Ethics of the American Bar Association as the ethical standards relating to the practice of law. The supreme
court has adopted the same as its rule 38. The law settling such matters
is found in the statutes, the Canons of Professional Ethics, and in the
judicial decisions. State ex rel. Turner v. Denman, 36 Tenn. App. 613, 259
S.W.2d 891 (M.S. 1953).
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verse interests, 36 the court's decision on this point is clearly sound.

In fact, it is difficult to understand how the petitioners could have
made the contention.
It is suggested that such litigation suggests the desirability of the
majority rule that gives a client the legal privilege and right to discharge an attorney without cause.37 The Tennessee rule38 contrary
to this rule was partly responsible for the case. When a client loses
confidence in an attorney, it should not be required that the client
prove that his loss of confidence is justified by objective evidence.
It does not lead to respect for the legal profession. In fact, if the
trial court in the earlier stages of the litigation had recognized the
universal rule39 that clients have the power to discharge attorneys
wrongfully, just as they can discharge an agent wrongfully, the case
might have taken a more desirable turn.

VI. DUTIES AND LIABILITIES OF AGENT TO PRINCIPALLIABILITY FOR Loss CAUSED

It is clear that when an agent by any breach of duty causes loss
to his principal, the agent is liable to the principal. The liability may
be for breach of contract, jn tort, or on a restitutional principle.4°
This is illustrated indirectly in a case previously discussed, Stewart
v. Craig,4 1 involving the effect upon the master's liability to a third
person for the agent's tort when the third person has given the
servant a covenant not to sue. As has been pointed out, 42 the basis
36. RESTATEMENT (SECOND), AGENCY §§ 387-89 (1958) deal with the agent's
duties of loyalty and the general rule of not representing adverse interests
without fullest disclosure to both parties. Id. § 394. Comment d is particularly
applicable to attorneys.
37. A leading case stating the majority rule and discussing the reasons
for it is Martin v. Camp, 219 N.Y. 170, 114 N.E. 46 (1916).

38. Brownlow v. Payne, 2 Tenn. App. 154 (W.S. 1925). Moyers v. Graham,

83 Tenn. 57 (1885), also recognizes that clients may be liable in breach of

contract for wrongful discharge of attorneys.

39. The trial court refused to permit the client to discharge the attorneys.
342 S.W.2d at 238.
"All authorities agree" that a client may discharge an attorney at any time.
"[T]his is merely the general rule respecting all contracts of service ....
SUNDERLAND, CASES ON JUDICIAL ADI/INISTRATION 118 (2d ed. 1948).
"[T]he authority of an agent terminates when the agent has reason to believe that the principal, if he knew the facts, would no longer wish him

to act in accordance with the initial authorization. ...
Thus, authority may
terminate although it is a breach of contract for the principal to terminate
it, or it may be terminated without affecting the contractual liability ...
[T]he principal has legal power . . . to terminate it before the end of the
contractual period . . . ." RESTATEMENT (SECOND), AGENCY ch. 5, topic I,

introductory note (1958). "Authority terminates if the principal or the agent
manifests to the other dissent to its continuance." Id. § 118.
40. RESTATEMENT (SECOND), AGENCY § 401 & comments (1958).
41. 344 S.W.2d 761 (Tenn. 1961).
42. See note 22 and accompanying text.
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of the decision was in part circuity of action and in part the doing
indirectly of what could not be done directly. The court specifically
stated that if the master was held liable to the injured party for the
tortious conduct of the servant, the master "in turn can turn around
and sue" the servant. There is nothing to indicate whether this is
based upon breach of the contract to be careful, upon a theory of tort,
upon an implied covenant to reimburse, upon the equitable principle
of exoneration, or upon general principles of restitution. Any or all
of these bases would seem appropriate.

VII. DUTIES

AND LIABILITIES OF PRINCIPAL TO AGENT-TORTS

Marsh v. Fowler43 involved an attempt by a servant farm hand to
recover against the master for injuries received while rounding up
cattle on the master's farm. The immediate cause of the injury
apparently was a frisky calf which ran between the front legs of the
horse which the plaintiff was riding. This caused the horse to
stumble and throw the plaintiff to the hard rocky road. The plaintiff
based his claim upon ten different grounds of negligence, including:
furnishing an unsafe place to work, requiring the plaintiff to engage
in hazardous duty, allowing the road to remain in a rocky condition,
failing to anticipate that the horse would run and the calf be frisky,
failure to provide assistance, failure to provide a safe horse, and failure to warn and caution.
The court refused recovery partly upon the grounds that the duty
to furnish a safe place to work did not apply to the rocky road; that
the law of Georgia, where the injury occurred, would be presumed
to be the same as Tennessee law since Georgia law was not pleaded;4 4
that the condition was obvious to the plaintiff; and that there was no
allegation that the horse possessed vicious or unusual tendencies.
The basic decision was simply that the frisky calf was the proximate
cause of the accident, and that if the defendant had exercised ordinary
care the accident would have happened anyway, there being no way
to anticipate the "vagaries in the conduct of a calf."
Since the master is not an insurer, the case involves only the
application of the normal rules of negligence concerning duty of
care, violation of the duty, causation and damages.
43. 340 S.W.2d 881 (Tenn. 1960).
44. The failure to plead the foreign law may not be the best grounds for
this point. Under Tennessee law the courts are to take judicial notice of sister
state law. TENN. CODE ANN. § 24-606 (1956). The court can call upon counsel
to assist in obtaining information. TENN. CODE ANN. § 24-607 (1956).

The

party relying upon the law must in some fashion, either in the pleadings or
otherwise, give notice to the adverse party. TENN. CODE ANN. § 24-610 (1956).
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VIII. CONCLUSION

Though the cases involved, in general, the application of basic
principles to routine cases, some of the cases were particularly interesting upon their facts. Significant, even in these cases, is the
problem of choice between conflicting policies. In at least one case, 45
the facts and history suggest the desirability of re-examining the
choice heretofore made.
45. Holcomb v. Steele, supra note 33 and accompanying text.

